The May 2026 Scottish Parliament elections delivered a clear, if not overwhelming, pro-independence majority. First Minister John Swinney has argued that this provides a mandate for a referendum the UK government cannot ignore, pledging to bring forward a Holyrood vote on pursuing a Section 30 Order — the mechanism through which Westminster temporarily transfers the power for a legally binding referendum.
The UK government has made equally clear it will not entertain a Section 30 request. Nevertheless, the Scottish Government appears determined to put independence back at the centre of political discourse, with Swinney indicating his government will publish a draft Referendum Bill within its first hundred days.
These developments revive familiar questions about the policy positions a future independent Scotland would adopt on issues from trade and currency to foreign affairs and defence — all reserved areas under the Scotland Acts. The 2013 White Paper’s failure to develop a persuasive position on these questions was a significant weakness in the 2014 campaign.
On European Union membership, the 2013 White Paper assumed a smooth transition via Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, with a target independence date of 24 March 2016. European Commission President José Manuel Barroso rejected this as unrealistic, arguing that accession would more likely require Article 49 — the standard procedure for new member states — raising the prospect of a veto by one or more of the then-28 members. In 2014, unionists argued that a vote against independence was the surest way to remain in the EU.
Brexit has transformed this terrain. Advocates of independence now contend that rejoining the Single Market — and eventually the EU — requires leaving the UK. Yet the veto threat has not disappeared. Navigating it would demand skilful diplomacy from a Scottish Government that would need to build a fully operational foreign ministry from its current International Trade and International Affairs Directorates, which run nine overseas offices. Scaling that up to perform the representation, reporting, and advisory functions currently delivered by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office would be an enormous undertaking.
Defence and security present equally formidable challenges. Scottish Government pronouncements on foreign policy have so far focused on relatively uncontroversial positions — Good Global Citizenship and support for Ukraine. A fully independent foreign and defence policy would need to grapple with a far harder set of questions: defence spending levels, national security strategy, arms exports, Scotland’s place in NATO, and, above all, nuclear weapons.
The SNP’s official position is that Scotland should be a full NATO member, fulfilling all alliance obligations. But this sits in tension with two significant complications.
The first is the party’s long-standing opposition to nuclear weapons. The SNP remains committed to removing Trident from the Faslane base in Argyll, arguing that Scotland’s security can be assured through conventional forces alone. This position was contested in 2014 as incompatible with NATO’s nuclear posture and a threat to European security — concerns that have only intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Polling since 2022 shows a clear majority of Scots now support retaining a nuclear deterrent, a marked reversal of pre-invasion attitudes. Critics argue the SNP’s stance is increasingly out of step with both public opinion and the current security environment.
The second complication is the Scottish Greens. The SNP’s key pro-independence parliamentary ally is firmly opposed to NATO membership, calling instead for defence spending to be redirected to peacekeeping and humanitarian work. The Greens’ website describes NATO as “a Cold War relic unsuited to addressing modern security threats” — while remaining notably silent on what those threats are, or how Scotland should address them.
Intelligence is another area requiring serious policy development. An independent Scotland would need to establish its own security and intelligence services and determine their scope and responsibilities. Central to this would be the question of whether Scotland could secure membership of Five Eyes — the most effective intelligence-sharing alliance in history — which has continued to operate with remarkable resilience despite the turbulence in transatlantic relations under the Trump administration.
Another referendum would therefore force the Scottish Government to provide convincing answers to questions it largely sidestepped in 2014. It will be instructive to see whether, more than a decade on, it is better placed to do so.
